! 4 also increased in the majority of countries, but the share where a decline has occurred is clearly larger than for the first tolerance measures. The last diagram shows how the share that thinks that it is important to teach kids tolerance has changed: again, an increase in most countries, but decreases in a few as well.
If one looks at the size of the changes, tolerance towards homosexuals has seen the biggest increases in recent years. We consider it important to try to pinpoint the causes of these developments and, especially, to see what role economic freedom has played.
Figure 1
The development of tolerance over time Notes: Each bar represents the average annual percentage-point change in tolerance in one country in our sample.
We use annual averages since the time periods for which we have data vary between countries (but they all occur between [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The first diagram depicts how tolerance towards homosexuals has changed in each country in our sample. The middle diagram depicts how tolerance towards people of a different race has changed in each country in our sample. The last diagram depicts how the share that thinks that it is important to teach kids tolerance has changed in each country in our sample.
What have earlier and somewhat related studies had to say about the determinants of tolerance? 7 Corneo and Jeanne (2009) find a positive relation between tolerance towards homosexuals and two policy-related factors: GDP per capita and becoming a new EU member state, which entailed prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Andersen and Fetner (2008) investigate what impact income inequality has on attitudes towards homosexuality, and their findings suggest a negative relationship but also that the better off become more tolerant with higher incomes. Hence, both income and income inequality seem relevant when studying the formation of tolerance. Somewhat loosely, Spitz (2004) argues that the free-trade agreement NAFTA, and the economic contacts and exchange that it gives rise to, will entail social integration between the United States and Canada, such that the former country will be more inclined to adopt same-sex marriage. Berggren and Jordahl (2006) We focus on societal-rather than individual-level determinants of tolerance in this study. For a defense of this focus, based on an understanding of tolerance as a social phenomenon, see Moreno-Riaño (2003) . property rights, hence demonstrating that economic institutions are able to influence social variables. Rode (2013) similarly relates the degree of market orientation of economic institutions to a social outcome variable, viz., happiness. In particular, access to sound money, free trade and freedom from regulation seem positively related to subjective well-being. 8 Consequently economic freedom appears to have explanatory potential when it comes to social factors like trust and happiness.
Lastly, a few studies look at attitudes toward aspects of economic freedom and how they relate to tolerance and some other social values. Weiss (2003) finds that anti-capitalist sentiments are strongly correlated with nationalism and ethnic intolerance in a group of formerly communist countries. Clearly, anti-capitalist sentiments are not the same as anti-capitalist policies, but the results do point at a possible relation between economic freedom and intolerance, if there is a connection between popular sentiments and policy. Granzin et al. (1997) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) report similar results: that people's preferences with regard to freer trade are negatively related to values concerning neighborhood attachment, nationalism, ethnocentrism and prejudice, while positively related to education.
Taken together, previous research suggests that societal-level factors, such as policies, institutions and socioeconomic outcomes, as well as sentiments towards such factors, exert an influence on people's ways of thinking and feeling about others. 9 It therefore seems straightforward to extend the analysis to relate economic freedom to tolerance.
Our main hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between economic freedom and tolerance, since economic freedom entails both market institutions of a certain kind and market processes that affect the way people think and feel about others. As for market institutions, they are legal institutions that create assurance in dealings with strangers. This comes about since the generality of the rule of law guarantees that legal rules apply equally to everyone and since the rule of law ensures that violators will be punished, which will deter cheating and exploitation. These market institutions also enable the market process, the dynamic functioning of the market economy, which we suggest can stimulate tolerance in three ways: first, by people internalizing a positive outlook on others through transactions that demonstrate that those who are different can be trusted; second, by a conscious desire to better one's situation and by realizing that this entails treating others, not on the basis of characteristics such as race or sexual orientation but on productivity; and third, by enabling a transformation of society from the small, closed group (that exerts pressure on people to conform to one way of life) to the great society, where people need not try to control and dislike those who deviate from majority practices and characteristics. These are, we propose, the main mechanisms that speak in favor of a positive relationship.
However, there is also the possibility of a negative relationship, if markets bring about greed and a perception that certain groups benefit in an unfair way from market exchange; if markets are anonymous and therefore bring about deceptive behavior; if markets crowd out altruistic sentiments; or if markets result in high inequality (see Hirschman, 1982) . Frey and Stutzer (2002) demonstrate more generally how institutions affect happiness levels.
To shed light on the direction of the relationship between economic freedom and tolerance we carry out a cross-sectional regression analysis for up to 69 countries. The results indicate that economic freedom fosters tolerance. In particular, the Economic Freedom Index is robustly positively correlated with tolerance towards homosexuals and with our measure on the importance to teach kids. These associations are in turn driven by two of the five areas of the Index: legal structure and security of property rights, on the one hand, and access to sound money, on the other. Consequently, in what we see as the long-run equilibrium, more freedom-inducing and secure market institutions appear to foster tolerance. Results from first-difference regressions confirm that increases in economic freedom makes people more open-minded to and accepting of homosexuals, especially when these increases come about through more stable monetary arrangements. Also, increases in government size seem to make more people think it important to teach kids tolerance. We tentatively interpret the results as causal, on the basis of using time lags and instrumental-variable analysis, as well as on the basis of the temporal dimension inherent in the first-difference analysis.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
What reason is there to expect a relationship between economic freedom and tolerance? We try to answer this question by first considering economic freedom overall and then by considering the five areas of the Economic Freedom Index separately.
Economic freedom and tolerance
Our main hypothesis is that there is a positive effect of economic freedom on tolerance, and it builds on two central features of markets -market institutions and the market process -which we argue can entail mechanisms for tolerance to emerge.
Let us begin with the role of market institutions. They are really legal institutions that undergird the economy and that are central for how it functions. 10 As Greif (2005, p. 730) puts it: "The extent of the market -the degree of voluntary exchange -is determined by its supporting contract-enforcement institutions." 11 According to Hayek (1960, pp. 154 ff, 207 ff) , the rule of law is a necessary component of economic freedom, and it applies when legal institutions that are general, public, stable and announced beforehand are established and enforced. Such rules could stimulate tolerance both directly and indirectly.
The direct effect is about creating assurance so that economic actors can act with less fear in their
10 However, Rypczynski (1996) and Greif (2005) point out that institutions are rarely imposed (especially not in their entirety) before markets begin to operate; rather, there is an ongoing development, where institutions influence markets and markets influence institutions, not least through the political process. 11 On how institutions relate to economic growth, see, e.g., Rodrik et al. (2004) , Acemoglu et al. (2005) , Beck and Laeven (2006) , Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006) and Asoni (2008) .
dealings with people, especially with those they know little or nothing about. Such assurance can come about in two ways. First, the generality aspect makes sure that the legal rules apply in the same manner to everyone, including government representatives, which ascertains that it does not matter with whom in particular you are interacting. Second, the rule of law ensures that violators will be punished, which will tend to deter violations of rules prohibiting cheating etc. (see Rothstein 2000, pp. 491-92) . This will in turn make people less distrustful of others and more tolerant, as they have less to fear from openness and diversity. As far as different kinds of tolerance are concerned, there is no reason to think that the direct effect of market institutions -the generation of safety and predictability through the rule of law -differs.
Both when homosexuals and people of different race are involved, this will tend to reduce fear of the unknown and benefit tolerance and the teaching of tolerance. Lastly, the indirect effect of market institutions on tolerance arises because such institutions enable the market process, to which we now turn.
The market process has the potential to stimulate tolerance in at least three ways: through internalization, through a conscious desire to advance one's well-being and through affecting group pressure. 12 Internalization is a process of developing a way of reacting and thinking that produces a spontaneous and unreflected tendency to assess, in our case, people that are different in a certain way.
One plausible outcome of such a process is tolerance. It can arise early in life through parental upbringing and schooling -and in a market-oriented society, children may very well be brought up and taught so as to be fit for participation in this kind of society (Bowles, 1998, p. 100 ff; Corneo and Jeanne, 2009 ). It can also appear as people continually enter into dealings with others and begin to trust them, in spite of their being different. The practice of commercial interaction and trade induces people to understand others and to realize that they do not pose a threat. If a society that relies heavily on markets offers this kind of experience, tolerance could very well result. 13 Here, one could expect a difference that relates to homosexuality being invisible (if homosexuals so choose), while race is almost always visible.
The visibility aspect could matter in different ways. On the one hand, if interaction with people that belong to some minority takes place without awareness of minority status, one would expect a smaller effect on tolerance toward homosexuals. People, quite simply, do not know that the nice people they do business (or whatever) with are homosexuals in the same way they realize that they are African or Indian.
On the other hand, immediate identification of minority status may cause some people to assess others in accordance with prejudices, which may block a positive interaction effect. When homosexuals are involved, prejudices may exist but may not be activated if the sexual orientation is unknown, and then
The market process can be defined as the dynamic, interpersonal, voluntary and competitive exchange activities carried out by economic agents under the rule of law. 13 It may be that what Adam Smith (1759) calls "sympathy" and "fellow-feeling" exists in humans for "biological" reasons, but the idea here is that such sentiments can be strengthened by certain cultural experiences and practices, such as those offered by markets. Lending some support for this idea, Macy and Skvoretz (1998) show how cooperation can emerge between strangers locally and spread through "weak ties" to outsiders. Similarly, Henrich et al. (2001) find experimentally that market integration explains a substantial proportion of the behavioral variation across societies. The idea is that the more people engage in market transactions, the more they will experience abstract sharing principles concerning behaviors toward strangers.
! 8 repeated market interaction may take place and give a positive view of people who only ex post become known to be homosexual. This may then generate greater tolerance. The visibility aspect may hence produce either lower or greater tolerance toward homosexuals than toward people of a different race.
The second tolerance-inducing effect of the market process is a preference to improve one's wellbeing, which can be seen as a self-interested reason for extending tolerance. What matters for our argument is that people, in striving for a better situation, realize that it may be obtained in interaction and exchange with numerous others -and often better obtained in that fashion than in solitude or when restricting oneself to interaction and exchange with small groups of people. 14 By being intolerant, by not being open to and not letting in people that are different from oneself into one's life or into the wider society, one foregoes a chance for enrichment. Intolerance comes at a cost, which will tend to discourage it. This relates to the theory of discrimination introduced by Becker (1971) , who points at a mechanism in markets for reducing the exclusion from the economy of people on other bases than low productivity.
For example, firms who do not hire people of a certain race, even though they are more productive, are at a disadvantage in the process of competition and experience lower profits than they otherwise would have. 15 This will tend to discourage discrimination. This does not mean that no one will be intolerant or discriminatory: indeed, a preference for intolerance or discrimination may be strong enough to outweigh the benefits foregone from openness. But ceteris paribus, the cost of exclusion will make exclusion less prevalent. Hence, in free market economy, with competing, profit-seeking firms and people set on maximizing their well-being, economic actors will have an incentive to be tolerant. 16 Here, it is difficult to see any reason for differential effects for different kinds of tolerance. It is costly to exclude people on the basis of both sexual orientation and race in a market environment, rather than on the basis of productivity. This will work against intolerance, and also stimulate people to teach tolerance to the next generation (as tolerance will benefit children financially).
A third effect of the market process relevant for tolerance concerns is group pressure. In a setting with no or weak market institutions, where the market process is not very developed, the group depends on its own production capacity to obtain the goods and services its members need and desire. In such a closed, autarkic setting, there is a strong tendency to meddle and to control people's lives: what they do concerns everybody. Those who are different may be disliked and stigmatized and not at all tolerated. As the market process develops, the group can direct its attention outward and flourish without relying on its group members to the same degree. This also reduces incentives for social pressure to conform to majority norms. Perhaps this is especially true for attitudes towards homosexuals, who on average have Buchanan (1993) explores the trade-off between participation in the market nexus, which entails dependence on others but also a higher expected material living standard, and autonomy. 15 This need not only be because of lower employee quality but also because of consumer reactions and boycotts, if discriminatory company policies get publicity -see Friedman (1999) .
fewer children, which might be an important group concern in a closed society. Again here, most homosexuals could be expected to remain "in the closet", to avoid intolerance. But intolerance could also be expected toward people of a different race, although there are probably not many such people present in this kind of society (partly for that reason). A possible difference between the two types of groups might be that homosexuals are more integrated: by being born into families already present, they might be more readily accepted, especially if they do not reveal their orientation until later in life. People of a different race might always be perceived as outsiders. Hence, tolerance might increase relatively more toward homosexuals when a society becomes more market-oriented. Lastly, in an open and dynamic society, parents will be more inclined to teach their kids tolerance.
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This positive take on the relationship between economic freedom and tolerance can be contrasted with more skeptical perspectives on the ability of markets to produce valuable social attitudes, values and behavior. Hirschman (1982) and Bowles (1998) The moral values that markets rest on were established in a pre-market era and are undermined by the large scale, anonymity, impersonality, shortsightedness and selfishness of the modern market process, not least its globalized form (see, e.g., Bauman, 1998, and Bowles and Gintis, 1998) . ( Lastly, tolerance may also affect economic freedom. If one is tolerant one is probably less suspicious or fearful of the way a market economy functions and hence more inclined to favor promarket institutions. The market, unlike a more planned economy, tends to yield unpredictable outcomes, oftentimes with an unknown or unequal distribution of income and wealth. A tolerant person is plausibly less inclined to find this daunting or disturbing, due to a weaker tendency to think in group-specific terms.
We return to this issue in the empirical testing.
The five areas of the Economic Freedom Index and tolerance
It is important to study the five areas of economic freedom separately, since economic freedom is a multifaceted concept. Hence, certain elements of it may stand in a different relation to tolerance than Therefore, the sign could be either positive or negative. If, for example, government spends a lot on education, this could provide both teaching input and socialization such that tolerance increases.
Governments using subsidies and transfers favoring particular interest groups at the expense of others may, however, breed mistrust and intolerance between people. Legal structure and security of property rights is a measure of the quality of the legal system, in terms of judicial independence, impartial courts, military interference and integrity, and of the extent to which economic actors perceive the legal system to protect their property and contracts. We expect the effect to be positive, for reasons outlined in the preceding section with regard to market institutions. Access to sound money captures the stability of the monetary regime and the inflation rate. It can be argued that the effect on tolerance is positive, since high and variable inflation tends to redistribute wealth in a manner which may be perceived as unfair and which may therefore cause tension in society. As people attempt to mitigate the uncertainty of future price levels, this can also lead to the absorption of considerable resources in information gathering (Fischer and Modigliani, 1978) . The negative welfare effects that follow may be a breeding ground for intolerance. Furthermore, in cases of hyperinflation, social unrest and tensions can be forthcoming, not least as political leaders in such situations may look for scapegoats, e.g., minorities. 19 Freedom to trade internationally measures things like taxes on international trade, regulatory trade barriers and international capital market controls (the higher they are, the lower EFI 4 ). On the one hand, this variable connects most closely to the doux-commerce thesis, which has been formulated most often with regard to trade (and its bringing about gentleness, understanding and peace). This implies a positive effect on tolerance. On the other hand, others have pointed out the disruptive effects of globalization and hard competitive pressure from abroad (Bauman, 1998) , which can make people feel threatened and less inclined to embrace differences. The net effect is thus unclear. Lastly, Regulation of credit, labor, and business reflects the degree to which credit markets, labor markets and the business sector are regulated: the less they are so, the higher EFI 5 . Regulation could increase tolerance if it restricts opportunistic and not pick "people of a different race" in answer to the very same question. The third dependent variable is calculated using the share of the population answering "Important" to the quality "Tolerance" when being asked the question: "Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Our main explanatory variables are six measures of the degree to which an economy is free from government involvement: the Economic Freedom Index (EFI) and its five areas: Size of government (EFI 1 ), Legal structure and security of property rights (EFI 2 ), Access to sound money (EFI 3 ), Freedom to trade internationally (EFI 4 ) and Regulation of credit, labor and business (EFI 5 ). There are several reasons for using this particular measure. First, because of its comprehensiveness (it looks at five different areas that each characterize economic and legal institutions in different and complementary ways). Second, because of its being used quite frequently in scientific analyses and thereby being quite well-known and accepted; as de Haan et al. (2006, p. 158) note in their survey of research which uses this index: "As the index of the Fraser Institute is the most widely used EF indicator, the present paper focuses on this index". Third, because of data availability; as the survey by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006, p. 63) states: "For the most part, researchers use the Fraser Institute … measure in growth studies, as it is the most comprehensive in terms of time span. Of the 52 studies, 33 use the Fraser Institute's measure of economic freedom". Fourth, because of its transparent construction (each component on which the Index is constructed is presented, so that it is easy to verify and grasp what the different areas really consist of).
Finally, because of the verification by Rode and Coll (2012) that the construction of the Index using five areas is not arbitrary: a cluster analysis of the individual components reveals that the components form into groups that are quite similar to the five areas. Tables A1 and A2 , a list of countries is given in Table A3 and a correlation matrix is presented in Table A4 : see the Appendix.
Let us briefly motivate our inclusion of the control variables. Material well-being can influence tolerance -in a situation of affluence, when competition over scare resources is less acute, more tolerance can be expected (Hodges Persell et al., 2001; Friedman, 2005; Andersen and Fettner, 2008) .
Education can be expected to increase tolerance in two ways: through socialization (having students from different backgrounds get to know each other) and through teaching (widening children's horizons). The share of young people is included since it is perceivable that that age category is less rigid and more open to new experiences, hence more tolerant. In a similar vein, the share of people living in urban areas can be expected to be positively related to tolerance, since diversity generally is greater in such areas than in less dynamic rural settings. Family value is a survey-based measure of how close family ties are on average (we use the measure developed by Alesina and Giuliano, 2010 , averaging three variables:
parents' duties and responsibilities, how much children should respect the elderly and how important family is in life). If one is strongly oriented towards one's close ones, one may be loss open to diversity in the larger world (cf. Ermish and Gambetta, 2010). The two fractionalization measures are indicators of how heterogeneous a country is. The predicted net effect on tolerance is unclear: while they may bring about an increase due to a greater probability of people meeting and getting to know others who are different, they may also bring about a decrease in tolerance, to the extent that differing groups tend to come into conflict with each other. The two religion variables capture shares of people who belong to a hierarchical religion, and it could be that identification with such a religion tends to decrease tolerance of those who do not follow the dictates of the prelates (Klosko, 2000; Bjørnskov, 2007; cf. van 
Any index of this kind has its drawbacks: e.g., they all to some extent use subjective measures (based on surveys or expert evaluations), the weighting schemes are to some extent arbitrary, the choice of variables is subjective, etc. Therefore, in section IV.4, we use the political risk rating from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2008) as an alternative measure of institutional quality, as a robustness check.
! 13 et al., 2012, who find a negative effect of religiosity on tolerance toward homosexuals As robustness tests we add social trust and income inequality to the baseline specification. The trust variable comes from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study and corresponds to the share of the population in each country who answer that "most people can be trusted" to the question "In general, do you think most people can be trusted or can't you be too careful?". We expect trust to affect tolerance positively: a context in which people trust others they do not know is reasonably one in which they also accept people who are different. In contrast, we expect the measure of income inequality to have a negative impact on tolerance (cf. Andersen and Fettner, 2008) , due to increased discontent from those who feel disfavored in society and due to a larger social distance between different groups of people. The data on income inequality come from Solt (2009) and refer to net income Gini. We include inequality in a robustness test rather than in the main analysis, to avoid a reduction in the sample following limited data availability for this variable.
We make use of two instrumental variables: central-bank independence and hyperinflation. These are motivated and used in section IV.3. The measure of central-bank independence comes from Polillo and Guillén (2005) and corresponds to the index defined by Cukierman et al. (1992) that captures the extent to which the central bank is independent from the political power in a country. The hyperinflation measure is a dummy which takes the value 1 if a country has a past experience of hyperinflation, and it is collected from Guerrero (2006) .
Our main explanatory variables and the control variables always predate the tolerance measures.
We think a lagged specification is reasonable since it reduces the risk that economic freedom and control variables influence tolerance and since the potential freedom effect on tolerance plausibly works with a delay.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Cross-sectional results
To get a first indication of whether economic freedom fosters tolerance, we carry out a cross-sectional analysis. The regressions are of the form:
EFI i denotes the Economic Freedom Index (or one of its five areas) for country i, while X i is a vector of control variables for country i. Table 1 contains the results for the overall EFI and our three measures of tolerance, as the model is gradually expanded.
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As can be seen, EFI is positively related, in a statistically significant way, to all the tolerance measures when controlling for other possible determinants of tolerance. The effect is strongest, both in size and statistical significance, for tolerance towards homosexuals. A one-unit increase in economic freedom is associated with the share of people being more tolerant towards homosexuals being about 7
percentage points higher. As for the control variables, they are mostly not statistically significant.
Looking at the columns with the "full" models, the most notable exceptions where tolerance towards homosexuals is concerned are negative relationships with religious fractionalization, the share of Muslims and political rights, as well as a positive association with South Asia. In the case of tolerance towards people of a different race, Latin America is positively and South Asia negatively related to it.
The kids variable is positively related to Europe and South Asia.
Introducing variables gradually, as we do in Tables 1 and 3 , is a way to ascertain that the results are not affected by the ratio between the number of variables and the sample size. 22 The number of observations between the three models of tolerance differs somewhat, since background information for our measures on tolerance of homosexuals and tolerance of people of different race is missing. However, for comparability we use a fix sample across specifications for each tolerance measure. The number of observations also differs somewhat between the different empirical analyses because of data availability. Comparing the cross-sectional sample with the first-difference sample, the latter is smaller because observations at different points in time are used, and for many countries, a data value is missing for one of the years, making it impossible to include those countries. In order to make more precise what elements of economic freedom that drive these results, we use the same model to estimate the relationship between the five areas of the EFI and the four tolerance measures. Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients of the five areas of the EFI without reporting, for reasons of space, the findings for the control variables. (1.572) (1.710) Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. All estimated equations include the specified measure of economic freedom, a constant term and the same full set of control variables as before, including the country-group dummies.
The results suggest that two areas are of particular importance for the economic freedom-tolerance relationship: EFI 2 , legal structure and security of property rights, and EFI 3 , access to sound money. For example, an increase of EFI 2 by one unit is associated with an increase in tolerance toward homosexuals of almost 6 percentage points. On the other hand, EFI 1 , size of government, and EFI 4 , freedom to trade internationally, seem unrelated to tolerance. The fifth area, EFI 5 , regulation of credit, labor and business, shows a relationship to the importance of teaching kids tolerance but not to any of the other tolerance measures. The significant effects are positive throughout. Overall, these findings are consistent with the theoretical reasoning proffered in section II.
First-difference regression results
We also study the development of economic freedom and tolerance by considering changes over a longer time period, running the following type of regression:
In equation (1), ∆!"#$%&'($ ! !refers to the change in tolerance in country i over a certain time period.
This specification maximizes the possibility of capturing mechanisms that increases tolerance in the long run. Following Bergh and Nilsson (2011) , we maximize the length of this time period for each country, and the dependent variable might consequently correspond to changes in tolerance over different periods for different countries. ∆!"# ! refers to the change in economic freedom in country i and corresponds to the same number of years as the country-specific tolerance spell. A first-difference analysis bundles all time-invariant country characteristics into an error component and estimates the relationship between economic freedom and various measures of tolerance robustly to latent heterogeneity due to time-invariant effects. Consequently this analysis also takes account of some potential problems related to endogeneity. In our specifications, we include information on the initial level of tolerance, referring to the tolerance level in the earliest year in each country's tolerance spell, and the initial level of the control variables included in the above cross-sectional specifications. Table 3 presents results from long-run relationship estimations, as the model is gradually expanded.
In general, the first-difference analysis confirms the previous results that more economic freedom fosters tolerance towards homosexuals, whereas change in tolerance towards people of a different race does not seem to be affected. 23 In the "full" model, more economic freedom is negatively related to the change in the share that thinks it is important to teach kids tolerance, but this finding is not very robust to the model specification, as a reduction of control variables renders the coefficient insignificant. Given the rather small sample, the significance in the last column could follow from the quite few degrees of freedom and should consequently be interpreted cautiously.
23 !One possible reason for different results for tolerance toward homosexuals and tolerance toward people of a different race is that the race issue was more pertinent some decades ago, whereas the issue of sexual orientation is of more current concern.
Hence, tolerance on the basis of race may already have been established in many places and may, as such, be insensitive to economic freedom.! When looking at the five areas of the EFI, in Table 4 , we see a long-run positive effect of the change in the stability of monetary policy and outcomes on the change in tolerance towards homosexuals.
Moreover, smaller government seems to reduce people's willingness to teach children tolerance.
24 Table 4 The areas of economic freedom and tolerance: first-difference results
Dependent variable:
Change tolerance homosexuals (1.324) (1.634) Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. All estimated equations include the specified measure of economic freedom, a constant term and the same full set of control variables as before.
The first result is in line with previous findings, as well as with the theoretical ideas of a relationship between EFI 3 and tolerance towards homosexuals presented in section II. That is, when monetary stability increases, this brings about more predictability and less arbitrary redistribution, which reduces social tensions and scapegoating, especially of groups with conspicuous consumption, which may be associated with homosexuals to a larger degree.
How it could be explained that parents find it more important to teach children tolerance when the size of government increases? First, if jobs in the public sector are offered and conducted in accordance with a strict non-discrimination and tolerance policy, parents could realize that as government becomes larger, it becomes more important for kids to be tolerant. On a similar logic, if childcare and schooling are provided by the government and if this provision grows in importance, it probably becomes important for children to get along with "everyone", including children from different backgrounds. As parents understand this, they think it more important to teach their kids (and that other parents teach their kids) tolerance. Second, an increase in government could mean that government "propaganda" about tolerance and non-discrimination becomes more intense, influencing parents to instill this type of social attitude.
Testing for causality through instrumental variables
While the preceding results indicate some areas in which economic freedom is related to, in particular, tolerance towards homosexuals, it is nevertheless uncertain if the effect is causal. We therefore apply an
instrumental-variable analysis for the cross-sectional sample, using two instruments: central-bank independence (CBI), as measured by the index in Polillo and Guillén (2005) , and a dummy for past experiences with hyperinflation, as presented by Guerrero (2006) . 25 CBI is most naturally related to the area of economic freedom that most consistently relates to tolerance, viz., EFI 3 (access to sound money), in particular inflation rates (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Crowe and Meade, 2008; Cukierman, 2008; Klomp and de Haan, 2010) . We suggest, however, that it is also a relevant instrument for economic freedom more generally: liberalized economic regimes tend to go together with independent central banks.
Furthermore, we are not aware of any empirical results showing a relationship between tolerance and central-bank independence, nor do we see any theoretical basis for expecting such a relationship to exist.
We therefore expect this instrument to be valid and uncorrelated with the error term. Guerrero (2006, p. 73) provides both theoretical arguments and statistical analysis to support the validity of hyperinflation as an instrument for stable monetary outcomes: "Simply knowing if a country had a hyperinflation in the past provides considerable information on its subsequent inflation performance: economies that have had hyperinflation display substantially lower rates of inflation." Equally important, past hyperinflationary experiences are not affected by tolerance. Having two instruments is moreover clearly advantageous, since it allows us to examine the validity of the instruments using a Sargan test. Table 5 presents the results.
We first check that the instruments are unrelated to tolerance towards homosexuals. We therefore simply include them in our baseline specification. The first two columns of Table 5 report the results from this exercise and show that the instruments are unrelated to tolerance, while the economic freedom coefficients of interest remain significant and do not change very much in magnitude. Moreover the instruments add very little explanatory value to the model. The following two columns report first-stage results for the two economic freedom variables. 26 The instruments work well: the first-stage F-test reveals that the instruments are jointly significant throughout. Lastly, in the second-stage analysis, reported in the last two columns, the Sargan test shows that the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at conventional levels of significance. Notably, the exogenous parts of EFI and EFI 3 remain significantly and positively significant related to tolerance toward homosexuals. These findings indicate
We are not the first to use central-bank independence as an instrument for monetary-policy outcomes. Barro (1995, p. 172) uses central-bank independence as an instrument for inflation, arguing that " [b] ecause of the difficulty of enacting changes in laws, it is plausible that a good deal of the cross-country differences in legal provisions that influence central bank independence can be treated as exogenous." Cf. Fang et al. (2010, p. 627) , who use a dummy for inflation targeting as an instrument for inflation based on the same logic. 26 We use information on central-bank independence in 1990 to instrument for economic freedom in 1995. Data on hyperinflation predate economic freedom in 1995. As described in Guererro (2006) , most instances of hyperinflation take place before the 1980s.
that economic freedom does seem to stand in a causal relationship to tolerance towards homosexualsboth EFI and EFI 3 retain statistical significance under instrumentation.
27 Table 5 Regression results using two instrumental variables n.a n.a 0.03 0.03 n.a n.a First stage F-test n.a n.a 3.89 4.03 n.a n.a Sargan (p-value) n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.451 0.817 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
EFI and EFI₃ are instrumented by the CBI index, a dummy indicating if the country previously experienced hyperinflation and the same full set of control variables as before.
Even though the IV analysis appears convincing to us, it does not rule out that there is a common, underlying causal factor behind both central-bank independence, past hyperinflation and economic freedom. What speaks against such a factor is that at least hyperinflation and economic freedom seem very different in character, which makes it more difficult to imagine a common cause.
Lastly, we would like to mention that we have investigated other potential instruments, based on Faria and Montesinos (2009) . They suggest four instruments to uncover the exogenous component of EFI using IV methods: latitude, legal origin, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and settler mortality. We have tried to instrument economic freedom using latitude and legal origin, but according to first-stage regression results and related tests, none of these instruments are valid in our setting.
28 Based on the results using central-bank independence and historical hyperinflation, however, we cautiously proceed on the assumption that economic freedom causes tolerance.
We have also used the two instruments one at a time, and the results are qualitatively similar as the ones reported here. Both instruments seem valid individually. Results are available on request. 28 We have not used ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrument since this factor correlates with tolerance. Also, settler mortality as an instrument has recently been questioned -see Albouy (2012) .
Robustness analysis
In order to see whether the results are sensitive to various changes in the way we conduct our empirical analysis, we carry out a number of robustness checks, relating to model specification and outliers. 29 First, we replace the two areas of Economic Freedom Index that are most consistently related to tolerance with two alternative measures: the political risk rating of ICRG (2008), which provides an alternative measure of institutional quality, and monetary freedom as measured by the Heritage Foundation (see Miller and Holmes, 2011) , which combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls. In particular, the ICRG is close to EFI 2 , which measures the quality of property rights protection and the rule of law, while monetary freedom is close to EFI 3 . 30 In the cross-sectional analysis the ICRG correlates positively with tolerance toward homosexuals, but the point estimate loses significance in the final full specification. In line with theoretical predictions and baseline findings, monetary freedom, however, remains positive and significant throughout the same exercise. None of the alternative economic freedom measures are significantly related to the two other tolerance measures, nor to changes in tolerance.
Second, we change the model specification by excluding and adding variables. We think of real GDP per capita as a potential mediator, i.e., a factor that is influenced by economic freedom and in turn affects tolerance (Berggren, 1999; Bergh and Nilsson, 2010) . It is not evident that a mediator should be included, as it will reduce the estimated effect of economic freedom on tolerance. Excluding GDP per capita, all the estimated coefficients of economic freedom increases in magnitude. In most cases the significance of the estimated economic freedom coefficient also increases. We also add two variables (one at a time): the net income Gini coefficient and social trust. As for Gini, it is not included in the baseline model for data-availability reasons. Adding it changes little as far as the economic freedom variables are concerned, and Gini itself is not significant, but one effect on the first-difference results still bears noting. If we add Gini to the model of the last column of Table 4 , the estimated coefficient of the size of government attains statistical significance. This, however, is clearly not a robust result but more likely a sample effect. As for trust, it is also related to economic freedom (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006) and could affect our findings. The results indicate that trust is a mediator in the relationship between economic freedom and tolerance. Social trust is in general positive and significant, while economic freedom retains its statistical significance, although the magnitude of the estimated EFI coefficients decreases in all cases. Still, the size of these point estimates implies that economic freedom as such is an important factor behind tolerance.
All results of this section are available on request. 30 The correlation between the ICRG measure and the overall EFI (EFI 2 ) is 0.71 (0.86). The correlation between monetary freedom and the overall EFI (EFI 3 ) is 0.74 (0.85). 31 We have carried out a more detailed analysis of the role of social trust and find that it functions as a mechanism through which economic freedom builds tolerance. It seems that people who trust others they do not know also are tolerant -and that a Third, we investigate whether the relationship between EFI and tolerance differs depending on development level by interacting the EFI variables with GDP per capita. We find that the interaction term for EFI and EFI 3 is never statistically significant, which suggests that the results between these EFI variables and tolerance are valid irrespective of the level of GDP per capita. However, for EFI 2 we find a significant effect for the interaction term, implying that the tolerance effect of economic freedom increases with the level of economic development.
Fourth, we use least trimmed squares (LTS) to carry out a test of outliers, i.e., observations that deviate from the linear pattern followed by the majority of the data. 32 The main advantage of LTS is that it can handle cases with several jointly influential outliers. Point estimates for tolerance towards homosexuals when outliers are removed suggest that our baseline results are not sensitive to outliers.
Removing outliers increase the size of the estimate and statistical significance is retained for the EFI variable throughout. Performing similar exercises for the three other dependent variables also suggest that outliers are not a problem.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since tolerance is associated with many desired outcomes, it becomes important to try to pinpoint what tolerance stems from. We propose to look, for the first time, at the role of the character of economic institutions and policies. Since there have been many heated debates about the merits or demerits of markets when it comes to establishing good values in society, and since most of these are theoretical in character, our contribution is to examine this issue empirically.
We make use of the Economic Freedom Index and its five areas to measure the degree to which institutions and policies are market-oriented. These measures are then related to three tolerance measures: tolerance toward homosexuals, tolerance towards people of a different race and people's opinion that it is important to teach kids tolerance.
Speaking on a general level, there are theoretical reasons to expect a positive effect of economic freedom on tolerance, and they have to do with market institutions and the market process. The former refer to the rule of law, including property rights and contract law, which creates assurance that makes people not fear interaction with others. The market process is in turn enabled by the rule of law and makes possible this interaction between people, which can bring about tolerance, through internalization of an attitude of openness and generosity, through a conscious desire to advance one's well-being or through reduced group pressure. That being said, there are also arguments for a negative effect of
given level of economic freedom brings about more tolerance the higher the share of people with social trust. For the details, we refer to Berggren and Nilsson (2012) . 32 We proceed in line with Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) and regard countries with a standardized residual above 2.5 as outliers.
For arguments in favor of using LTS, see Temple (1999) and Sturm and de Haan (2005) .
economic freedom on tolerance, e.g., by stimulating selfishness, by relying on anonymous transactions under asymmetric information, by increasing inequality and by crowding out intrinsic motivation and pro-social preferences. In the end, it is an empirical matter what sign the relationship has.
Our findings are obtained by both through cross-sectional and first-difference analysis. The idea is to make sure that the method of analysis as such is not driving the results and to discern whether there are differences that inform us about such things as how the time horizon affects the results. We find that the results are relatively consistent, suggesting that there are statistically significant and quantitatively important relationships between aggregate economic freedom and tolerance, both at a given point in time and over time. Notably, the relationships are generally positive whenever statistically significant (with the primary exception, in some cases, of EFI 1 ).
We furthermore find differing effects: tolerance towards homosexuals is most clearly affected by economic freedom, whereas tolerance towards people of a different race is generally unrelated to it. We speculate these different effects could be explained by the different character of homosexuals and people of a different race. If homosexuals are seen as part of one's own group, already integrated into families and workplaces, or if they are not really noticed at all, then economic freedom may more easily extend into open and generous attitudes to them, compared to people of another race, who are more easily noticed, perceived as outsiders and less integrated into social life and the labor market. Looking at the different types of economic freedom, EFI 3 (access to sound money), but also EFI 2 (legal structure and security of property rights), matter most consistently for tolerance. A possible explanation for the former result is that countries in which the value of money is unstable, there is uncertainty about incomes, prices and assets, and there is a risk for scapegoating minorities, especially if they are prone to engage in conspicuous consumption. A possible explanation for the latter result is that a stable legal system makes people more prone to take risks, engage in market transactions and not see others as threats.
The time dimension in the first-difference results as well as the instrumental-variable analysis for the cross-sectional results, indicate that the relationship between economic freedom and tolerance towards homosexuals can probably be regarded as causal: economic freedom indeed appears to foster tolerance.!! All this being said, we acknowledge that empirical research on topics such as how institutions and social variables like tolerance relate to each other is a thorny endeavour and recommend carefulness in interpreting the results. Table A3 List of countries 
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